Rule of Law and Judicial Accountability in Democratic States

Authors

  • Irma Indra Wahyuni Universitas Hang Tuah, Surabaya

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54518/ldi.2.2.2024.1288

Keywords:

Accountability, Democracy, Judicial Institutions, Rule of Law, Supremacy of Law

Abstract

The principle of the rule of law places judicial institutions as one of the main pillars in ensuring legal supremacy and maintaining democratic governance. This study aims to analyze the effectiveness of regulations concerning judicial independence and accountability based on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, and Law Number 14 of 1985 concerning the Supreme Court as lastly amended by Law Number 3 of 2009. In addition, this study examines the urgency of discussing judicial accountability in supporting the implementation of the rule of law in democratic states. This study employed a juridical normative method by examining legal materials, including statutory regulations, legal doctrines, and relevant scholarly literature. The analysis was conducted using secondary legal materials published within the last five years and indexed in Google Scholar to ensure the relevance and currency of the discussion. The analysis is conducted using conceptual and statutory approaches. The findings indicate that the existing regulatory framework has provided an adequate foundation for an independent and accountable judiciary. Furthermore, strengthening judicial accountability plays an important role in enhancing institutional legitimacy, reinforcing checks and balances mechanisms, and building public trust in the judicial system. Therefore, maintaining a balance between independence and accountability is essential to support the realization of a democratic state governed by law and justice.

References

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Published

2024-12-30

How to Cite

Wahyuni, I. I. (2024). Rule of Law and Judicial Accountability in Democratic States. Law and Democracy Insight, 2(2), 169–178. https://doi.org/10.54518/ldi.2.2.2024.1288

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